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There are so many versions of the gravity model in the international trade literature that their
results on trade effects inevitably vary even for the same international blocs. This paper
evaluates these alternative specifications, and compares the resulting trade effects. The results
show that there is considerable sensitivity to the specification of the gravity model used.
Therefore, it is important to use the proper specification to accurately measure the trade
effects. This paper suggests that removing restrictions on the parameters of the model with the
introduction of year, exporter, importer, and bilateral effects is necessary to properly specify
the model. In particular, factors included in the augmented model, especially monetary and
spatial variables, are significant. An analysis of the resulting model also shows that international
blocs effect on trade vary across blocs by the level of integration, the degree of their
implementation, and their sectoral coverage.
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I. Introduction
Numerous studies (Deardorff 1984; Eichengreen and Irwin 1998; Feenstra 1998;
Evenett and Keller 2002) have shown that the most fruitful way to predict
international trade flows is through gravity-type models. Accordingly, trade volume
increases with the size of trading partners’ economies, and decreases with the
geographical distance between them (Tinbergen 1962; and Poyhonen 1963). These
simple but successful empirical models are primarily used to test for the role of
blocs on trade.1
 Since then, a number of additions and adjustments have been proposed to the
standard gravity model. The merits of using GDP at current prices versus purchasing
power parity adjusted GDP, or choosing imports versus total trade as the dependent
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variable have been discussed. The standard model has also been augmented by
factors such as common border and common language. Monetary variables were
also added to capture the role of exchange rate variability. A location index was
introduced to take the remoteness of a country into consideration. Most of these
are now fairly common additions in gravity models. More recently, econometric
issues such as the use of cross-sectional, time series, or panel data are being
discussed. In particular, discussions on adjustments include Dhar and Panagariya
(1999) on the choice of dependent variable, Winters and Soloaga (1999), Wall
(2003), and Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) on including fixed effects.
The contribution of this paper is tri-fold: evaluation of the above-mentioned
specifications, extension of the econometric model of Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003)
to allow simultaneous tests of multiple blocs, and assessment of the role of
international blocs, ranging from various degrees of economic integration
agreements to those organizations based on religion, ethnicity, colonial history,
and security.
The results suggest that the additions of various factors to the standard model
improve its overall fit. In particular, common border, common language, per capita
incomes, monetary variables such as the real exchange rate and common currency,
spatial effect factors such as the location index all significantly contribute to the
explanation of the bilateral trade and should be standard in all gravity models.
Secondly, the results indicate that the restrictions on the parameters of the model,
specifically on the intercept, should be removed with the introduction of year,
exporter, importer, and bilateral fixed effects. Furthermore, instead of bloc dummy
variables directly in the models, these fixed effects should be analyzed for the
blocs’ role on bilateral trade. The analysis of the resulting properly specified model
shows that trade effect varies not only across different types of blocs, but also
with the degree of implementation and the coverage of the bloc agreements. Some
blocs foresee a deeper level of integration than others. They may also differ in the
duration of liberalization period towards zero tariffs, as well as how many and
which sectors are included in liberalization. These characteristics play a significant
role in explaining the differences in the size of trade effects across blocs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II lays out the empirical
strategy with a discussion of the particular blocs included in the analysis as well
as the different specifications of the gravity model in the literature. In Section III,
the data is applied to these specifications, and blocs’ trade effects are compared
across different gravity models, across blocs of different types, and with the results
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II. Empirical Strategy and Data
Ninety-nine countries are included in the analysis. These are all countries that
reported their trade volumes to the World Trade Organization during 1992-99.
These are listed in the Appendix according to their region: Middle East, Europe,
Africa, Americas, and Asia-Pacific.
Countries are further grouped into blocs based on their membership in
international organizations, and participation in important economic integration
agreements. Organizations and agreements analyzed are listed in Table 1. The list
of international organizations is obtained from CIA World Factbook. The resulting
14 organizations are separated into two categories based on their descriptions:
Non-economic organizations (NEO), and organizations for economic cooperation
without integration (OEC). These categories reflect the different expectations on
the trade effects of NEOs and OECs: NEOs are chosen to capture the role of
cultural, religious and ethnic similarity, and colonial or security relations.2 OECs
involve cooperation among countries that do not necessarily share common values,
such as OPEC. OECs are not as extensive as an economic integration agreement,
but they are expected to have some trade promoting effect.
International economic integration agreements are analyzed in separate
categories, since they are expected to have a much more significant role on trade
patterns and volumes than both the NEOs and the OECs. Twenty-two bilateral and
eighteen multilateral agreements are considered. These are all of the economic
integration agreements that were in force during the period of analysis according
to WTO. These agreements are divided into six different types: preferential trade
agreements (PTA), free trade agreements (FTA), customs unions (CU), economic
areas (EA), monetary unions (MU), and full-fledged integrations (FI). The
expectation is that the effects on trade get stronger with the removal of more trade
barriers of any kind. Hence, the FTAs are expected to be more trade promoting
than the PTAs, similarly EAs over FTAs, and MUs over EAs. However, trade
effects of CUs are not necessarily expected to be higher than those of FTAs.
Furthermore, the additional effect of FIs over other types depends on what full-
fledge integration entails. For example, more regulations in factor and product
markets in an FI would imply a negative effect over other types. Lastly, the degree
2 Some organizations that are not exclusive in membership such as Organization of American
States, Council of Europe, Organization for African Unity, and United Nations are excluded if
membership in these organizations does not produce a meaningful testable hypothesis. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 340
Table 1.  International organizations and agreements
Type Bloc code                              Bloc name
NEO AL Arab League
NEO AMU Arab Maghreb Union
NEO C Commonwealth
NEO CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
NEO GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
NEO NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEO OIC Organization of the Islamic Conference
OEC APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
OEC ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
OEC BSEC Black Sea Cooperation Zone
OEC ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
OEC OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEC SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
OEC OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PTA ACPEU African Caribbean and Pacific Group of States-EU
PTA BA Bangkok Agreement
PTA CAN Andean Community of Nations
PTA SAPTA South Asian Preferential Trade Area
PTA COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
PTA GATT General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
PTA WTO World Trade Organization
FTA ANZCERTA Australia-New Zealand
FTA EA Europe Agreements: 10 Central and East European Countries-EU
FTA MEDI Mediterranean Agreements: Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia-EU
FTA EUFTA All free trade agreements of the EU
FTA CEFTA Central European Free Trade Area
FTA NAFTA North American Free Trade Area
FTA EFTA European Free Trade Area)
FTA BFTA All other bilateral free trade agreements
CU CZSK Czech and Slovak Republics
CU EUCU Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey-EU
CU CARICOM Caribbean Community and Common Market
CU MERCOSUR Southern Cone Common Market
CU CACM Central American Common Market
CU CISCU Commonwealth of Independent States Customs Union
EA CAEU Council of Arab Economic Unity
EA EEA European Economic Area
MU WAEMU West African Economic and Monetary Union
FI EU European Union341  INTERNATIONAL BLOCS’ TRADE EFFECT
of implementation and the extent of coverage are also important factors that need
to be considered in the comparisons.
Membership in these blocs is not static. New members join in, or the integration
among all or a group of members often intensifies in sub-blocs over time, resulting
in a nested structure. This structure can be best explained by taking Europe as an
example, since it presents the most elaborate structure of blocs. There are two
groups of FTAs in Europe: EFTA and EUFTA. The latter compromises the FTAs
signed by the EU. Since some of these agreements are of particular interest, they
are considered separately, such as the sub-bloc MEDI signed with Mediterranean
countries, and the EA signed with East European countries. Some of the East
European countries formed another sub-bloc, the CEFTA. Within the CEFTA, the
Czech and Slovak Republics increased the intensity of integration to a customs
union, the CZSK. Some of the countries participating in EUFTA formed a customs
union EUCU. Some in the EUCU increased the intensity first to an economic union
EEA, and some further into a full integration, the EU. Part of the EEA countries is
also integrated to each other within the EFTA. Furthermore, the membership in
these blocs has been increasing. For example, there were only twelve countries in
the EU at the beginning of the period of analysis. Membership increased to fifteen
by the end of the period. The EA was signed with only four countries in 1992. In
1999, there were ten countries in this bloc. Composition of these regional and
interregional blocs is pictured in Appendices B and C.
The effects of these blocs are typically captured in gravity models with the
help of dummy variables. In such analysis, signs and significance of these dummy
variables quantifies the additional effect of a sub-bloc over the effect of the bloc
itself. For example, the EU variable will capture the additional effect of being an EU
member over the effect of being just an EEA member. The expected sign of a sub-
bloc variable is positive if more trade barriers are removed as a result. Lastly, the
signs of these bloc variables will show the differing effects if the intensity is the
same. For example, the MEDI dummy variable will capture how different the
Mediterranean agreements are relative to all FTAs signed by the EU (EUFTA). In
this case, the signs will capture the role of factors such as the number of years, the
degree of implementation, the coverage of the agreement, and how successful the
agreement is in promoting trade among members.
Different gravity models have been used in the literature to measure the role of
these blocs on trade. Table 2 lists a selection of the models used, including the
blocs analyzed, the findings, as well as the specifications used in the analysis. The
simplest version of the model has bilateral total trade between countries as a JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 342
Table 2.  Previous literature
Data Blocs/Results Authors
Cross-sectional (yearly EA(+) Wang and Winters (1991)
averages): Model (1) ACPEU+* Nilsson (2002)
Cross-sectional (each EU+*, EFTA+* Aitken (1973)
year separate): Models EU+, EFTA+* Bergstrand (1985)
(2) and (3) EU+, EFTA+*, CACM+*,CAN+ Brada and Mendez (1985)
CACM+*, CARICOM+* Thoumi (1989)
APEC+*, EU+*, EFTA+*, EEA+ Frankel and Wei (1993)
NAFTA+, CAN+*, MERCOSUR+* Frankel et al. (1995)
EA+*, CEFTA(-) Gros and Gonciarz (1996)
CAN-, CACM+* Garman et al. (1998)
APEC+*, ASEAN+ Endoh (1999)
EU-, EFTA-* Sapir (2001)
SAARC-* Hassan (2001)
CIS+* Djankov and Freund (2002)
CIS+*, EA+*, CEFTA+*, CZSK+* Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc
(2003)
EU+*, CACM+*, NAFTA+, Martinez-Zarzoso (2003)
AMU+
Time series MU+ Thursby and Thursby  (1987)
Panel: Model (4) EEA+*, EA(+) Baldwin (1994)
NAFTA+* Gould (1998)
NAFTA+ Krueger (1999)
3 AIC, which is a measure that balances the complexity of the model with its goodness of fit,
is based on the concept of entropy. SC is similar but more general, and it imposes a penalty for
including too many terms in a model relative to sample size.
function of the product of their GDPs and the geographical distance between
them. This relationship is expressed in linear form using the logarithm of these
variables. Dummy variables are added to this model to capture the role of blocs
and to test for their significance. In this section, the specifications used in the
literature are compared, and the superiority of these is evaluated using adjusted
R2, F statistic, root mean square error (RMSE), the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC), and the Schwarz Criterion (SC).3343  INTERNATIONAL BLOCS’ TRADE EFFECT
AMU-*, GCC-* Al-Atrash and Yousef  (2000)
ASEAN+* Thorton and Goglio (2002)
Panel (year fixed EU+*, EFTA+* Bayoumi and Eichengreen
effects) (1995)
EU-*, EFTA-*, ASEAN-*, GCC+, Winters and Soloaga (1999)
NAFTA+*, CACM+*, CAN+*,
MERCOSUR+*
Panel (country fixed NAFTA+* Wall (2003)
effects) MU(+) Kurihara (2003)
Panel (year, importer APEC+ Matyas (1997)
and exporter fixed CEFTA-*, EA(+) Jakab et al. (2001)
effects): Model (5)
Panel (year, importer, APEC+* Egger and Pfaffermayr
exporter, and bilateral (2003)
fixed effects): Model (6)
Notes: Effects are denoted as follows: +*: significantly positive; +: insignificantly positive; -:
insignificantly negative;
-* significantly negative; (+) potentially positive; (-) potentially negative.
Table 2.  (Continued) Previous literature
Data Blocs/Results Authors
Most of the early models used cross-sectional data. The regressions were
carried out using yearly averages of the variables, or separately for each year.
Wang and Winters (1991) argue for averaging over years because this reduces the
effects of temporary disequilibria and shocks. Accordingly, the standard gravity
model is the following:
01 2 3  , ij ij i j k k ij
k
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where Tij is the total trade between countries i and j.4 dij is the geographical distance
 Model (1)
4 One issue not addressed in this paper is the treatment of zero observations. While Santos Silva
and Tenreyro (2006) argue that standard OLS regression can lead to severe biases in the
coefficients, Feenstra (2002) argues for the consistency of OLS estimates as long as fixed
effects for importer and exporter are taken into account. For the sake of comparability, zero
observations are treated in the same manner across different models considered. The most
widely used method of natural logarithm of dependent variable plus one, is also employed here.
Poisson-pseudo maximum likelihood estimation suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006)
is applied only to the properly-specified model (6) to check the sensitivity of results. The JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 344
between i and j. Data on geographical distance is obtained from the US Census. Yi
and Yj are the logarithms of the GDPs at current prices of countries i and j,
respectively. The World Bank’s WDI 2003 is the source for the GDP data. Dk is the
dummy variable for bloc k. In this model, all variables are averages over the entire
period of analysis.5
Averaging has an econometric problem: it forces the parameters of the model
to be the same for every year. For this reason, as can be seen from Table 2, most of
the cross-sectional analysis done in the literature involves separate regressions
for each year:
The results of models (1) and (2) are given in Table 3. Note that all variables
have the expected signs and are significant in both models. Although model (2) is
more econometrically sound, model (1) provides a better fit, as can be seen from
more significant coefficients, higher adjusted R2, and lower RMSE, AIC, and SC.
This is primarily because of reduced variability due to averaging.
Since these early models, there have been a number of additions to the gravity
model, which are now frequently included. Most notably, per capita incomes (or
population) of the partners are added to capture the effect of income levels. Common
border has also proven to be an important determinant of trade flows (Thoumi
1989; Linnemann 1969; Bergstrand 1985). Furthermore, Frankel et al. (1995) show
that countries with colonial links, thus common language, trade more with each
other.
Monetary variables are also typically added to the model to obtain what is
commonly referred to as the augmented model. While Bergstrand (1985) included
the exchange rate and the GDP deflator separately to get the effect of changes in
the real exchange rate, others such as Thoumi (1989) added the real exchange rate
more directly.6 It is also common to include variables to capture the effect of
results are fairly robust due to very few zero observations in highly aggregated country-level
trade data.
5 If over the course of time one of the partners becomes a member of another bloc too, the
period of analysis is divided into sub-periods, during which memberships of the two partners are
the same, and averages are taken over these sub-periods.
6  Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995) also suggested including the real exchange rate to control
for third country effects, which are otherwise omitted. Bergstrand (1985) included unit value
prices as well. However, Wang and Winters (1991) argue that the inclusion of price terms is
inconsistent with the long term nature of the model.
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exchange rate uncertainty since Thursby and Thursby (1987) found its negative
impact. For this purpose, foreign currency reserves of the importer as a measure of
exchange rate stability are used in Matyas (1997). Common currency is also typically
factored in as another variable, since countries that share a common currency
engage in substantially higher international trade (Summers 1991; Rose 2000).7
Most recent additions to the model capture the spatial effects. In particular,
Frankel and Wei (1998), and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) introduced an
indicator of countries’ relative remoteness to the model. Omission of this indicator,
also known as the location index, is said to influence the estimated effects of blocs
in a systematic manner. The location index is computed by weighting bilateral
distances with partner countries’ share in world exports. Within this context, Porojan
(2001) also argues that the traditional formulation of gravity models seriously
overestimates trade flows from island countries, and that large explanatory power
of dummy variables for blocs vanishes when spatial effects are introduced.
Another econometric problem is the choice of the dependent variable. Among
others, Dhar and Panagariya (1999) argue that total trade should not be the
dependent variable, because it imposes equality of coefficients for imports and
exports. This criticism is widely accepted. In fact, most authors estimate the gravity
equation using import data on the assumption that countries tend to monitor their
imports more carefully than their exports (Baldwin 1994, p.85):
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where yit and yjt are per capita income levels in country i and j in year t, respectively.
Bij is set equal to 1 if countries i and j share a common border, and Lij is equal to 1
if i and j speak the same language. eijt is the real exchange rate, and Rit is the
importer’s foreign currency reserves. Real exchange rate is defined as the price of
country j products in terms of country i products. Data on monetary variables is
obtained from the IMF International Financial Statistics. To incorporate the spatial
effects, the location index (li) and island dummy variables (Ii and Ij) are also in the
model.
7  In this analysis, this is unnecessary since such effects are already captured in blocs that fall
under the category of monetary union.
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Table 3.  Regression results for main factors
Variable Symbol (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -33.7** -35.3** -28.8** -29.5** - -
(-73.8) (-49.7) (-41.3) (-114) - -
Distance dij -1.18** -1.07** -1.24** -1.23** -1.21** -1.34**
(-44.4) (-25.7) (-36.7) (-96.9) (-100) (-126)
Importer GDP Yi 1.01** 1.05** 0.78** 0.74** - 0.74**
(95.2) (63.6) (31.6) (85.1) - (85.2)
Exporter GDP Yj 1.03** 1.05** 1.17** 1.21** - 1.23**
(92.8) (60.0) (86.4) -235 - -250
Importer per capita yi - - 0.13** 0.12** 0.76** 0.10**
GDP - - (7.00) (16.8) (15.6) (15.1)
Exporter per capita yj - - 0.18** 0.15** 0.30** 0.12**
GDP - - (9.50) (21.4) (6.07) (18.6)
Common border Bij - - 0.35** 0.43** 0.27** 0.50**
dummy - - (2.59) (8.18) (6.16) (10.0)
Common language Lij - - 0.51** 0.46** 0.60** 0.59**
dummy - - (8.03) (19.4) (26.9) (28.2)
Real exchange eij - - -0.004** *-0.000 -0.000 -0.000
rate - (-6.35) (-1.27) (-1.73) (-1.42)
Importer FX reserves Ri - - 0.053* 0.10** 0.18** 0.12**
- - (2.06) (11.7) (12.9) (13.7)
Importer location li - - -0.82** -0.78** - -0.96**
index - - (-10.9) (-27.5) - (-35.3)
Importer island Ii - - 0.14* 0.13** - 0.26**
dummy - - (2.43) (6.20) - (12.6)
Exporter island Ij - - 0.47** 0.57** - 0.75**
dummy - - (8.52) (27.7) - (37.9)
n 8449 28343 53488 53488 53488 53488
Adj. R2 0.752 0.724 0.744 0.740 0.980 0.995
F 595.7 1959 3386 2991 10598 163705
AIC 3.802 3.911 3.878 3.892 3.475 2.131
SC 3.839 3.923 3.886 3.900 3.515 2.142
RMSE 1.615 1.709 1.682 1.693 1.372 0.702
Notes: the numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Variables significant at 95% and 99% confidence
are denoted by * and **, respectively. In model (5), Yi and Yj  are excluded due to multicollinearity
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As can be seen from Table 3, using imports as the dependent variable in model
(3) approximately doubles the sample size relative to model (2). This increases the
overall fit of the model, as measured by the F statistic. However, at the same time,
there is more variability, as reflected in lower adjusted R2, and higher AIC and SC.
Results of model (3) show that per capita GDPs, common border and common
language variables have the expected signs, and all are significant. Furthermore,
the change in the real exchange rate has the expected negative sign on imports,
and as expected, exchange rate stability implied by higher levels of foreign currency
reserves promotes trade. Both coefficients are significant. Results of model (3)
also suggest that omission of the location index from the model would result in
underestimated imports volume for remote countries. It is also found that imports
from, and imports of island countries are significantly higher.
The yearly cross sectional models (1) through (3) considered so far have one
econometric advantage over panel models. The former allows different parameters
for each year. In contrast, the reasoning behind panel models is twofold. First,
sample size increases in panel models. This allows more definite judgment on the
role of blocs due to smaller confidence intervals (Breuss and Egger 1999). Second
and more importantly, the additional effect of changes in the nature of a bloc from
one year to another are now observable. The additional effects of such changes
were not captured in yearly cross sectional analyses. For example, this was the
case in SAARC and SAPTA, and for GATT and WTO. Since there is no year where
both blocs exist at the same time, the observed effects in yearly cross sectional
models are the combined effects of both of these blocs. The additional effect of
SAPTA over SAARC, similarly that of WTO over GATT were not observed. For
comparison, a panel regression is also carried out following the model below:
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Note that year subscripts from the coefficients of all variables are dropped,
since the regression is carried out over pooled data over the years, rather than
separately for each year.
Panel analyses, where year fixed effects or country fixed effects are
incorporated, are only recently carried out. The idea is to allow the constant of the
model to be different for each year and country, thus eliminate this econometric
disadvantage of panel models over yearly cross sectional models. Winters and
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Soloaga (1999) include time dummy variables to capture year fixed effects. Similarly,
following Wall (2003), country fixed effects are incorporated into the model below
separately for importers and exporters.
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where at, gi, and lj are year, importer and exporter country fixed effects, respectively.
In this model, also known as the triple-indexed model, exporter and importer fixed
effects control for all time-invariant country characteristics. Year fixed effects
capture cyclical influences commonly shared by all countries. Cross-sectional
models and time series models set year fixed effects and country fixed effects to
zero, respectively. Thus, these models are setting unnecessary constraints. Glick
and Rose (2001), and Egger (2000, 2002) also argue that gravity models that restrict
intercepts to equality suffer from heterogeneity, and result in inconsistent estimates.
Some time-invariant variables of country characteristics, such as island dummy
variables and the location index, are omitted from the above model since these are
captured by country fixed effects. The results of the above panel model can be
found in Table 3. All coefficients have the expected sign, and all are significant,
except for the real exchange rate. Sensitivity analysis suggests that the addition of
year fixed effects to model (4) did not have much effect on the overall fit.8 In
contrast, the AIC and SC measures, and adjusted R2 imply a significant improvement
in fit with the addition of importer and exporter effects in model (5).
In all of the previous models, the role of blocs is captured by using dummy
variables. Polak (1996) criticizes such use of bloc dummy variables directly in the
model as they may lead to incorrect inferences. Following this argument, Matyas
(1997) shows that all gravity type models used for this purpose are mis-specified
from the econometric point of view. Instead of including bloc dummy variables
directly in the model, Matyas (1997) argues that the country fixed effects should
be analyzed for the role of blocs. In particular, Polak (1996), Matyas (1997), and
Egger (2000, 2002) compare the exporter and importer effects of members of a bloc
to those of non-members. They argue that both should be higher for members.
There are some limitations to their approach. First, they exclude time-invariant
variables of country characteristics, arguing that exporter and importer effects will
 Model (5)
8 The adjusted R2 of a model with a constant should not be compared to that of a model without
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capture their effect, just like in model (5). However, in that case, the differences in
these effects between members and non-members will be due not only to
international blocs, but also these omitted variables. Alternatively, if all of the
usual factors are controlled for, including these time-invariant variables,
international blocs can be more accountable for the differences in these effects.
Furthermore, their approach does not accommodate changes in membership.
This is because they are examining country fixed effects, which do not vary over
time by definition. For the same reason, their approach does not allow multiple
blocs where some countries establish a sub-bloc during the period analyzed. When
membership in a bloc changes, or when more than one bloc is analyzed, simple
comparisons of fixed effects of members with those of non-members will not be
conclusive. During the period of analysis, if a country becomes a member of a bloc,
whether you keep its importer or exporter effect within the bloc or outside, the
difference between members and non-members will be blurred and most likely be
insignificant. When multiple blocs are considered, the difference between members
and non-members cannot be only attributable to the bloc being analyzed. This is
because some of the members could also be a member of another bloc, possibly of
higher density, which could be the primary reason for the difference. In another
case, the difference due to a bloc may appear to be insignificant, since non-members
of that bloc might be members of another bloc, which might be increasing their
exporter and importer effects.9 In both cases, multiplicity of blocs, and layers of
intensity in sub-blocs within a bloc complicate the picture, and render simple
comparisons of country fixed effects inconclusive.
Lastly, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) add bilateral interaction effects to the
panel model with exporter, importer and year fixed effects. Bilateral effects capture
any time-invariant influences for a country pair, including agreements between the
two countries. They find that the hypothesis of zero bilateral interaction effect is
strongly rejected and conclude that the triple indexed model ignores relevant
information, suffers from omitted variable bias, and consequently results in
inconsistent estimates. Formulated this way, the bilateral effects will primarily
capture the role of blocs, and exporter and importer effects will capture any remaining
fixed effects of a country after controlling for the usual factors.
These problems can be overcome if the bilateral interaction effects are analyzed
instead of the importer and exporter effects, and if these bilateral effects are allowed
9 In fact, Matyas (1997), who challenges the significant role of APEC found in previous studies,
finds an insignificant role for APEC in his model. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 350
to assume a different value each year. The analysis should also be done in two
steps instead of one. First, a panel regression can be carried out against all of the
usual factors. The bilateral effects obtained in this manner will be different for each
year, and reflect only the abnormal levels of trade after controlling for all of the
significant factors. Thus, the role of blocs can be better captured. In the second
step, bilateral effects are regressed against all of the bloc dummy variables to
correctly measure the blocs’ effects given the membership dynamics and their
nested structure. Note that this approach does not fall under the criticism of Polak
(1996), since dummy variables are not directly used in the model with other variables,
and it follows Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) in the sense that the role of blocs is
extracted from bilateral effects.
In sum, the whole process is as follows:
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Note that in step 1, separate bilateral interaction, importer and exporter constants
are allowed for each year. The results of the first step of this model are shown in
Table 3.  Measures of specification are based on both steps.  The introduction of
bilateral fixed effects in model (6) made a significant improvement in fit, as reflected
in substantial decreases in AIC, SC, and RMSE.
III. Results
In this section, the results about the role of blocs in trade are compared across
blocs of different intensities, different gravity models, and with the findings in the
literature. Before these comparisons, there are some important considerations that
may be partly responsible for the observations.
One important factor to consider when comparing blocs of different intensities
is that even if two blocs fall under the same category of intensity, this does not
mean that their role in trade is going to be the same; their effect also depends on
the degree of implementation. For example, while SAPTA is a fairly recent bloc,
COMESA, and CAN have been in force for a long period of time. Therefore, their
full effect is more reflected in trade volumes, which might not be the case for
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SAPTA. Another source of difference is the way the dummy variables are formulated
in the corresponding models in the literature. As discussed in Section II, blocs in
this analysis are defined so that they reflect the additional effect over sub-blocs of
different or the same intensity formed primarily by the same member countries.
However, in most analysis in the literature, this distinction between EUFTA, EUCU,
EEA, and EU has not been pointed out. Therefore, the only bloc used in such
analysis, say EU, reflects the effects of all sub-blocs under it, while in this analysis
it just reflects the additional effect of the bloc over its sub-blocs of highest intensity
(EEA).
Table 4 gives the role of blocs obtained from the six gravity models discussed
in Section II. A few observations are noteworthy. Most importantly, there is
considerable variation in the magnitude, the sign and the significance of the bloc
dummy variables across specifications. Out of forty blocs considered, only fifteen
of them have consistently positive coefficients, and only five have consistent
negative coefficients across different models. Among those that have consistent
signs, only CIS, EUFTA, WAEMU, CACM, CARICOM, APEC, SAARC, C and
GATT have been consistently significant. Even for these blocs, the changes in the
magnitudes across models are quite striking. All of these observations lead to the
importance of having the proper specification, where no unnecessary restrictions
are imposed and where bloc dynamics are taken into account such as model (6).
The introduction of country fixed effects had the primary effect of making the
role of almost all blocs more significant. Substantially more bloc effects turned out
to be significant in models (5) and (6) in contrast to models (1)-(4). Despite the
increased significance, the magnitude of bloc coefficients have decreased in model
(5), and especially after the introduction of bilateral effects, and more careful
consideration of bloc dynamics in model (6). This observation implies that gravity
model specifications, where country fixed effects and especially bilateral effects
are omitted, will overstate the role of blocs in trade volume.
In the rest of this section, the results of model (6) are examined in comparisons
across blocs, and are contrasted to those of the literature. The signs of CIS, CZSK,
WAEMU, MERCOSUR, CACM, CARICOM, APEC, and SAARC in model (6) are
consistent with those of the literature listed in Table 2. For some blocs such as
AMU, GCC, CEFTA, EFTA, EU, CAN and ASEAN, there is no well established
consensus in the literature. Some predict positive effects while some others find
negative impact of these blocs. Incidentally for GCC and EFTA, model (6) finds
insignificant effects. For CEFTA, the widespread finding is a negative effect, but
Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc’s (2003) cross-sectional study finds a positive impact, just JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 352
Table 4. Magnitude of regional and global international organizations
Organization            Region     Type (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)
AL ME NEO 1.10** 1.21* -0.24* -0.22 0.36** 0.40**
AMU ME NEO 0.01 -0.20 0.30 0.30 1.24** 0.82**
GCC ME NEO 2.94 2.29 0.17 0.47 0.66* 0.38
CAEU ME MU 0.74 -0.55 -0.07 -0.05 0.00 -0.21
MEDI EU FTA -0.65* -0.93* -0.85* -0.79** 0.23* 0.24**
BSEC EU OEC -0.40 -0.33 0.26 0.24* 0.85** 0.68**
CIS EU NEO 1.14* 1.14* 2.34** 2.50** 2.47** 2.32**
CISCU EU CU 0.19 -0.45 -0.72 -0.45 -0.36 -0.34
EA EU FTA -0.72** -0.89* -0.31 -0.10 -0.40** -0.21**
CEFTA EU FTA 0.16 0.29 1.00* 1.08** 0.76** 0.65**
CZSK EU CU 2.63* 2.45 2.53 2.49** 2.45** 2.32**
EFTA EU FTA 0.59** 0.53* 0.22 0.18** -0.14** -0.00
EUFTA EU FTA 0.84** 1.10** 0.52* 0.47** 0.20** 0.09
EUCU EU CU 0.62* 0.55 0.00 -0.02 -0.00 0.15*
EEA EU EA 0.10 0.35 -0.27 -0.20** -0.23** -0.12*
EU EU FI -0.84** -1.18 0.02 -0.02 -0.46** -0.52**
ECOWAS AF OEC -0.61 -0.65 0.21 0.20 1.34** 0.52**
WAEMU AF MU 2.72** 3.22** 1.79* 1.93** 1.69** 1.62**
ACPEU AF PTA 0.70** 0.65** 0.21 0.22** -0.00 0.12**
COMESA AF PTA -0.46 -0.18 0.76* 0.84** 1.54** 1.09**
CAN AM PTA 0.72 0.79 0.90* 0.80** 1.00** 0.93**
MERCOSUR AM CU 1.42* 1.37* 0.27 0.29 1.59** 0.91*
NAFTA AM FTA -0.79 -0.95 -1.08 -0.89** -0.03 -0.40*
CACM AM CU 2.18** 2.38** 2.35** 2.43** 2.89** 2.02**
CARICOM AM CU 3.93** 4.28** 2.70** 2.64** 2.96** 2.49**
APEC AP OEC 1.58** 1.74** 1.13** 1.11** 0.73** 0.48**
ASEAN AP OEC 0.27 0.12 0.30 0.32* -0.84** -1.01**
SAARC AP OEC -1.88** -2.16** -0.85 -0.74** -1.21** -1.20**
SAPTA AP PTA 0.26 -1.62** -0.79* -0.02 0.47 0.26
BA AP PTA -0.52 -0.66 0.41 0.43** -0.44** -0.43**
ANZCERTA AP FTA 0.22 0.15 -0.52 -0.53 1.40** 1.05**
OIC GL NEO -0.79** -0.67** 0.36* 0.36** 0.79** 0.45**
NATO GL NEO -0.58** -0.66** -0.23 -0.25** -0.45** -0.40**
C GL NEO 0.76** 0.63** 0.40** 0.41** 0.22** 0.12**
OPEC GL OEC -0.53 -0.51 -1.11* -1.20** -0.21 -0.26*
OECD GL OEC 0.98** 0.98** -0.17 -0.12** 0.21** 0.22**
GATT GL PTA 0.56* 0.41* 0.06* 0.16* 0.44* 0.08*
WTO GL PTA 0.02 1.05** 0.48* 0.02 0.26** 0.00
BFTA GL FTA 1.21* 1.85 1.48* 1.40** 1.15** 0.95**
Notes: *, ** denote significance at 95% and 99% confidence levels, respectively.353  INTERNATIONAL BLOCS’ TRADE EFFECT
like model (6). For the EU, the majority of the analyses find a positive impact, with
the only exception of the panel study of Winters and Soloaga (1999). Model (6)’s
finding of negative impact could be due to differences across studies in definitions
of the EU bloc, as discussed earlier. The same could be the reason for the negative
significant effect found for EA in contrast to the findings in the literature since in
this paper, the EA captures the additional effect over the EUFTA.
A major case of inconsistency of model (6)’s results with the literature arise in
the case of NAFTA. While model (6) finds a negative significant effect of NAFTA,
the finding in the literature is quite the opposite. This might be due to insufficient
coverage and/or implementation in this bloc. One other possible explanation could
be omission of bilateral effects from Wall (2003), and the omission of this and other
country effects from other analyses in the literature, where unnecessary constraints
are placed in the absence of these effects.
Generally speaking, a negative coefficient for a bloc could be a result of not
only model misspecification but also some other factors. The added effect of the
bloc over the sub-bloc has been trade restrictive due to over regulation in the
name of further integration such as in the EU. Another explanation could be trade
diversion10 from non-members that have another bloc with some of the members
of the former bloc.11
An important result from model (6) is that trade volumes incrementally increase
with intensity of blocs. The additional effects of preferential trade agreements
have been positive, as can be seen from SAPTA over SAARC. Free trade agreements
and custom unions also had a positive additional impact over the role of blocs of
lower intensity (BFTA over GATT; ANZCERTA over C; MERCOSUR over CAN;
CZSK over CEFTA; and EUCU over EUFTA). The only exception is the additional
effect CISCU over CIS, where CISCU suffers from late and insignificant
implementation. More regionalization of an agreement had a positive impact as
well, as can be seen from MEDI over EUFTA, CEFTA over the EA, COMESA over
ACPEU, even if these agreements have the same intensity. One exception is the
effect of the EA over the EUFTA. It must be remembered, however, that the EAs
have been criticised because of sensitive sectors that were left out of liberalization.
10 For more on trade creation and diversion, refer to Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997), Endoh
(1999), or Kruger (1999).
11 In fact, the sensitivity analysis, where blocs are incrementally included in the analysis,
suggests this as a possible explanation. Excluding the EU and its sub-blocs from analysis results
in a positive coefficient for NATO. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 354
These sectors happen to be those that the Eastern European countries have
comparative advantage (Messerlin 1993).
At higher levels of intensity, the additional effects have been unexpectedly
negative. The additional effects of the only two economic areas, CAEU and EEA
have been negative over the sub-blocs of lower intensity in their region, AL, and
EUCU, respectively. The same is true for the only full integration, EU over EEA.
The causes of these could simply be that these particular blocs do not provide any
additional trade promoting effects over the sub-blocs, and that instead, these
blocs might imply restrictive regulations that hamper trade. Another high level of
intensity bloc, monetary union, had a positive and significant additional impact, as
can be seen from WAEMU. But, this is only over ECOWAS, which has the small
intensity of OECs.
Finally, the expected positive effect of culture stemming from history, religion
and ethnicity is observed. Common history through colonial links in C and CIS
leads to a significant positive effects on the trade of member countries of these
blocs. Common religion increases trade in members of the OIC. A similar positive
result is observed in blocs of similar ethnicity such as AL and AMU. However,
NATO, the only security alliance bloc analyzed, fails to have a positive impact on
trade of its members.
IV. Conclusions
This paper applied trade data to different gravity models to compare and evaluate
the specifications proposed in the literature. It examined the role of blocs in trade
across different models, and groups of blocs with different intensity of integration.
It also suggested some improvements of its own.
The results indicate that using the proper specification is crucial to accurately
measure trade effects of blocs. All unnecessary restrictions on the parameters of
the model should be removed, even if such changes might reduce the overall fit of
the model. In particular, average values should not be used since that forces the
parameters to be the same for every year. Moreover, imports should be used as the
dependent variable rather than total trade; otherwise, equality of parameters is
imposed for exports and imports. More importantly, different parameters should be
allowed for different years, exporters, importers, and partner pairs, with the
introduction of year, importer, exporter, and bilateral interaction effects to the model.
Lastly, direct inclusion of dummy variables for blocs in regressions of trade should
be avoided, and bilateral effects should be alternatively analyzed for the role of
blocs.355  INTERNATIONAL BLOCS’ TRADE EFFECT
This paper also extended the models with fixed effects to render the role of
blocs more observable. Time invariant variables of country characteristics are kept
in the model to control for all the usual factors affecting trade so that bilateral
effects reflect only the other uncontrolled factors such as the international blocs.
Fixed effects are measured separately for each year to capture changing
memberships over the period of analysis. Furthermore, given the number of blocs
considered, and their differing intensity of integration, to account for each bloc’s
additional effect, another step is added where bilateral effects are analyzed.
The analysis on the role of blocs shows that, although for some blocs the sign
and significance is pretty much consistent throughout different models, any model
other than a properly specified model might yield incorrect conclusions. The
properly specified model suggests that cultural ties through religion, ethnicity and
colonial relations are important trade promoting factors. Most importantly, trade
increases with intensity of integration in blocs. Monetary unions have significant
additional positive impact on trade over customs unions, which are in turn more
trade promoting than free trade areas, preferential trade areas and organizations of
economic cooperation. Only economic areas and blocs with full integration are
found to have a negative additional impact over the sub-blocs of lesser intensity.
The degree of implementation and the coverage of integration agreements are
partly responsible for the difference in role of blocs of similar intensity.
Appendix
A. Country coverage
Middle East (ME): Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia.
Europe (EU): Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Croatia,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, and UK.
Africa (AF): Algeria, Benin, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius,
Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, S. Africa, Senegal, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo,
Tunisia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
Americas (AM): Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, USA, Uruguay, and
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Asia-Pacific (AP): Australia, Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia,
Japan, Kyrgyzstan, South Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand, Philippines,
Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.
B. Composition of regional blocs
Notes: the subscripts are the number of member countries covered in the analysis. Arrows
connect an organization to another formed by some members at dates shown on the line, if the
latter is formed after 1992. Sources: CIA World Factbook, and the official web sites of indivi-
dual organizations.357  INTERNATIONAL BLOCS’ TRADE EFFECT
Notes: UN is connected to all organizations except GATT/WTO and APEC. Its connections
are not shown to avoid complication. Regional organizations are denoted in italics. Sources:
CIA World Factbook, and the official web sites of individual organizations.
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